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Regulatory reform in the Nordic electricity-supply markets has resulted in a single integrated 
Nordic electricity market. This paper performs an econometric study of market power in the 
spot market of Nord Pool, the joint Nordic power exchange. I use a dynamic extension of the 
Bresnahan-Lau model, and weekly data for the period from 1996 through April 1999. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study of power markets that is not able to reject the hypothesis of 
perfect competition. The most likely reason for this absence of market power is the low 
ownership concentration in generation in the integrated Nordic electricity market.  
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1.  Introduction 
The last decade has seen the deregulation of several power markets around the world, and 
especially the US and EU electricity supply industries are undergoing a process of 
fundamental change. A central feature of most liberalised markets is a Power Exchange, PX, 
with an optional or mandatory spot market, and, as a complement, a market for financial 
instruments (futures, forwards and options). The spot market accommodates suppliers and 
consumers in an auction determining market clearing prices and quantities, while the financial 
market performs price hedging. In Europe today, there are PXs with spot markets in England 
and Wales, The Netherlands, Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), Spain 
and Switzerland.  
The Scandinavian deregulation led to the establishment in 1993 of the joint Nordic 
Electricity Exchange, otherwise known as Nord Pool. In this paper a test is performed for 
market power in Nord Pool’s spot market, Elspot.  
To attract customers, a non-mandatory PX needs a spot market that creates confidence 
among its actual and potential participants. Effective competition in the spot market is 
important from several perspectives, directly for cost efficiency, transaction costs and the 
potentially large distributional effects of market power, indirectly for its impact on related 
financial markets. On the other hand, because of the very small short-run elasticity of demand 
market power has little impact on short-run demand or short-run allocative efficiency. Market 
power, however, distorts the least-cost utilisation of existing capacity, and if spot prices can 
be manipulated, fewer market agents will use the spot price as a reference when designing 
bilateral contracts, which would increase the share of bilateral contracts, leading to higher 
transaction costs. Just as for bilateral trade, the PX-based financial market is heavily 
dependent on a well functioning spot market to provide a relevant reference price. Any 
unnecessary uncertainty in the spot price, due to possible strategic pricing, lends an extra 
uncertainty to the financial contract prices. This leads to a diminished trade on the financial 
market which in turn decreases the possibility for all participants in the electricity market to 
hedge their contracts, thus reducing liquidity in the whole market. Research also indicates that 
the presence of a well functioning financial (futures) market might actually reduce market 
power on the spot market, see Coq and Skytte (1999). Thus, reduction of the volume of 
futures trade can in turn lead to an increase in market power on the spot market, making the 
situation even worse.   
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Moreover, electricity spot markets seems to be extra susceptible to strategic 
behaviour. While results in experimental economics suggests that 5 firms of equal size are 
enough to force prices close to marginal cost in a “normal” industry, the results by Rudkevich 
et al. (1998), in a game-theoretic framework, suggests that more than 30 firms of equal size 
are needed to ensure competitive pricing in an electricity spot market.  
Against this background, there are good reasons to perform studies of market power in 
the power industry and to understand firm behaviour in competitive power markets. After the 
seminal study by Green and Newbery (1992), there has been a surge in studies on the 
behaviour of the liberalised power markets, especially England and Wales, but also Australia 
and California. While there have been many studies concerning market power in power 
markets, few of them have attempted to measure actual levels of, rather than potential for, 
market power
1. Instead, most analyses are based on simulation models, investigating the 
potential for market power. This is, of course, due to the fact that, until a few years ago, 
liberalised power markets were virtually non-existent, so simulation was the only option.  
The main contribution of this study, is an analysis of market power in the Nordic spot 
market. This is – to my knowledge – the first econometric study of market power in the whole 
Nordic spot market, i.e. at the so called system level, without transmission constraints, as well 
as the first econometric study of market power in a system dominated by hydropower. The 
market clearing volume and price are called the  system turnover and the  system price 
respectively, the latter which, because of transmission constraints, may deviate from so called 
area prices, which appear when transmission constraints are binding. (This system price is 
also the reference price for the financial market.) I apply a dynamic extension of the classical, 
static, Bresnahan-Lau (Bresnahan, 1982, and Lau, 1982) model for identification of market 
power. The hypothesis of no market power cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance 
level, and in fact this seems to be the first study that does not reject perfect competition in an 
electricity market.  
A few other papers have considered the Nordic electricity market.  Johnsen et al. 
(1999) analyses the Nordic market, focussing on transmission constraints and local market 
power. They do not attempt to measure actual market power at the system level, but instead 
                                                 
1 Brennan and Melanie (1998) model various bidding games in the Australian market; Borenstein and Bushnell 
(1999) simulate the potential for market power in the fully deregulated Californian market, expected to occur in 
2001, while Borenstein et al. (1999b) measure actual market power in the Californian market, during the summer 
of 1998; Borenstein et al. (2000) and Cardell et al. (1997) both examine the sensitivity of market power in power 
markets due to transmission capacity constraints; Wolak and Patrick (1997) and Wolfram (1999) attempt to 
measure actual market power in the British spot market.  
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examine five Norwegian bidding areas,
2 finding evidence of market power only in one of 
them, Kristiansand, and limited evidence in another, Bergen. As a matter of fact, a presumed 
competitive system price provides the benchmark for their analysis.  
  Amundsen et al. (1998) also examine the Nordic market, evaluating the effects of free 
electricity-trade between the Nordic countries. Simulating both Cournot and perfect-
competition equilibria, they find that with free trade the Cournot-equilibrium prices and the 
equilibrium prices under perfect competition are close, while the differences are much greater 
when no inter-country trade is allowed. Before liberalisation of the Swedish market, 
Andersson and Bergman (1995) in a Cournot model analysed the potential for market power 
in an isolated Swedish market, finding a very large potential.  
In the next section I describe the Nordic power market. The model is presented in 
Section 3, and the data and variables are explained in Section 4. After integration and 
cointegration tests, the empirical model is specified in Section 5. The empirical results are 
presented in Section 6, while Section 7 summarizes and draws conclusions.  
 
2. The Nordic Power Market  
 
2.1 The Nordic Power Industry 
Until quite recently Norway and Sweden were the actual market area for Nord Pool, and I will 
give a short outline of their power industries before describing Nord Pool itself. 
  Norwegian power industry is made up almost entirely of hydro, and more than 99.9% 
of all production comes from hydro-based generators. Due to the almost total reliance on 
hydropower, the between-year variations in total output are high. Total generation in Norway 
is about 100-120 TWh per year, with only two producers, Statkraft and Norsk Hydro, 
generating more than 10 TWh per year. The overall concentration is fairly small, with a 
Herfindahl index of about 0.12 and a CR2 of about 0.37
3.  
In contrast to Norway, the Swedish power industry has a high degree of market 
concentration, with a Herfindahl index of 0.33. Vattenfall and Sydkraft, the two largest 
producers, generate more than 70% of the total Swedish output of about 150 TWh and 
Vattenfall alone accounts for more than 50%. Sweden is also different from Norway in that 
                                                 
2 The bidding areas are Bergen, Kristiansand, Oslo, Trondheim, and Tromsö. The concept of bidding areas in the 
Nordic market is explained in Section 3.3. 
3 However, almost 50% of Statskrafts generation and 100% of Norsk Hydros is tied up in long-term contracts to 
electricity intensive industries. Adjusted for this, von der Fehr et al (1998) end up with a Herfindahl index of 
0.07 for Norway.   
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about 50% of generation comes from nuclear power plants, about 45% from hydro plants and 
only about 5% from thermal (co-generation) plants.  
Although there may be no direct link between concentration and market power, in an 
isolated Swedish market, we would expect substantial market power to be present; see 
Andersson and Bergman (1995) and Amundsen et al. (1998)
4. Actually, however, the 
situation is one where Sweden and Norway can be considered as one market, in which 
Vattenfall’s market share falls to about 30% and the Herfindahl index to 0.12. In the joint 
Nordic market, the question is much more open
5.   
 
2.2  Nord Pool  
The markets of Nord Pool consist of the spot market, Elspot, which is the object of attention 
in this study, and the futures market, Eltermin, which is a purely financial (3 year horizon) 
market with futures, forwards and options. Nord Pool began operating officially in 1993 with 
Norway as the only area. Sweden joined in January 1996, Finland was fully integrated in 
March 1999. West-Denmark became a separate price area in July 1999. Border tariffs with 
Norway and Sweden reduce trade across the borders. Thus, without transmission constraints 
the spot price will be the same in Finland, Norway and Sweden but higher in Denmark.  
The spot market is non-mandatory, and only about 25% of all traded electricity in 
Norway-Sweden is managed by Nord Pool; the rest is handled by bilateral contracts. 
Nevertheless, Nord Pool plays an important role, since trade at the margin takes place here, 
and the spot price of electricity is an important reference when determining prices in bilateral 
contracts.  
 
2.3 Market Procedures at Nord Pool 
Nord Pool’s spot market is a one-hour, one-day-ahead double-auction market, and 
participants can place bids for each hour the next day until 12 hours before the market opens. 
Bids can be made valid for an entire week, or for several single days
6.  
To handle transmission constraints, the market is divided into several price, or 
bidding, areas. When the constraints are binding, prices differ in the bidding areas, with 
higher prices in deficit areas and lower prices in surplus areas. Sweden and Finland always 
consist of only one area each, whereas Norway may be divided into as many as five. (Internal 
                                                 
4 Borenstein et al. (1999a) discuss concentration measures and market power in electricity markets. 
5 See Hjalmarsson et al. (1999) for a description of the Nordic electricity supply industry and the reform process. 
6 For details, see Nord Pool (1998).  
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bottlenecks in the grids in Sweden, Finland and Denmark are handled by counter purchase.) 
Nord Pool distributes information to all market participants regarding which bidding areas 
will apply during the following week, based on data from the system operator in Norway, 
Statnett. Statnett also has the option to change the current week’s bidding areas, should 
unexpected events occur. The overall system price and system turnover are the theoretical 
price and quantity that would have prevailed had there been no limitations in the grid. During 
most times of the year there are no, or very small, transmission constraints, so that deviations 
from the system price are usually small; see Figure 1 which shows the system price and Oslo 
and Stockholm prices. 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
Actual bidding is done by participants submitting their bid curves to Nord Pool 
showing how much they are willing to buy or sell at different prices, and in what bidding 
area. The participants do not know the price of their own trades until all participants have 
submitted their bids and the equilibrium price has been calculated. When the price is 
calculated, each participant receives an exchange quantity which corresponds to their price-
differentiated bid or offer. 
In order to calculate the price, all the bids and offers are grouped together on an offer 
(sale) curve and a demand (purchase) curve. These curves represent Nord Pool’s aggregated 
supply and demand, the market-clearing price is calculated at their intersection. This is the 
system price. If there are no transmission constraints, all bidding areas will be treated as one, 
and the system price will be its area price. If there are transmission constraints, however, then 
market clearing occur in each of the constrained areas, yielding separate area prices.  
 
3.  The Model 
Unlike with many other industries, cost functions in the power industry are rather transparent, 
and we can, at least in some cases, derive a good approximation of the marginal cost function. 
From this the Lerner index as a measure of any deviation from marginal cost pricing can be 
calculated, and thus of the magnitude of market power. This is done both by Borenstein et al. 
(1999b) in their examination of the California Electricity Market, and by Wolfram (1999) in 
her study of the British market. 
Borenstein et al.  (1999b) assume that there is no strategic use of hydropower 
resources. While a price-taking firm acting in a perfectly competitive market would try to 
allocate its hydro reservoirs (given reservoir constraints) in order to equalise prices across 




7. While their assumption may very well be true for the Californian power market, it is 
of course not appropriate for the Nordic market dominated by hydro and nuclear
8. They make 
their assumption due to difficulties in measuring opportunity cost when utilising hydropower. 
While the actual marginal (operating) cost in hydropower production is very close to zero, the 
opportunity cost, in foregone opportunity to produce electricity at some other time, might be 
considerable. This opportunity cost, however, is nearly impossible to observe or measure, and 
I will make no attempt to do so. Instead I turn to an econometric model for measuring and 
identifying market power.  
 
3.1 The Classical Bresnahan-Lau Model 
The model to test for market power which I will use is an extension of the classical 
Bresnahan-Lau (BL) model; see Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). The BL model is based on 
the fact that profit-maximising firms will set their marginal cost equal to their perceived 
marginal revenue,  MC=MRp. Price-taking buyers are assumed. In perfect competition 
MRp=P, but when market power is present we have MRp<P. The model lets us identify the 
presence of market power, without knowing the demand function or the cost function a priori. 
Instead, the solution is to estimate the demand and supply relations.  
  The demand function can be represented as: 
 
(,,) QDPZae =+                             (1) 
 
where Q is quantity, P is price, Z is a vector of exogenous variables affecting the demand 
function, a are the parameters to be estimated, and e is the error term. 
The supply function for price taking firms can be written as: 
 
(,,) PcQW bh =+                   (2) 
 
where W are exogenous variables affecting the supply function, b are the parameters in the 
supply function, h is the error term, and c(.) is the marginal cost function. 
However, when firms are not price takers, perceived marginal revenue, not price, will 
equal marginal cost. We now get a supply relation: 
                                                 
7 See Bushnell (1998) for an analysis of the strategic use of hydropower. 




  (,,) -  (,,)   PcQWhQZ blah =+             (2¢) 
 
where  P+h(.) is marginal revenue, and P+lh(.) is marginal revenue as perceived by the firm. 
Thus h(.) is the semi-elasticity of market demand,  Q/(¶Q/¶P), and l is now a measure of 
market power. When l=1 we have a monopoly, or a perfect cartel, and when l=0 we have 
perfect competition. 
  The problem, of course, is to identify l. The demand function is always identified but 
not so the supply relation. Bresnahan (1982) shows that in order to identify the supply 
relation, we must introduce not only shift variables for the demand curve, but also variables 
that are able to rotate  the demand curve. This is done by adding the vector  PZ to the 
explanatory variables for the demand curve, where Z is a vector that also includes variables 
that are capable of changing the slope of the demand curve. The economic reasoning behind 
the inclusion of these interaction variables is that the variables in Z are assumed to be able to 
not only shift demand, but also to alter the price-elasticity of demand. This is in most 
circumstances a very reasonable assumption.  
To see that l is indeed identified under these conditions, we look at the simplest form 
of a linear demand and supply relation. In this case we write (1) as: 
 
0            pZPZ QPZPZ aaaae =++++             (3)    
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             (4) 
    
 since  MR=P+[Q/(aP+aPZZ)]. Obviously  l is now identified. The demand side is still 
identified, and by regarding aP and aPZ  as known we can write 
* /() PPZ QQZ aa =-+. There 
are now two included endogenous variables,  Q and  Q
*, and two excluded exogenous 




The formal effect of including the rotation variable, PZ, in the demand equation, is 
that the demand function is not separable in  Z. Lau (1982) shows that this condition is 
necessary and sufficient to identify l.
9 
 
3.2 The Bresnahan-Lau Model in a Dynamic Framework 
The classical BL model is static representing some kind of long-run equilibrium, whereas, 
when modelling markets, some sort of short run dynamics are assumed to be present
10. Here I 
suggest a simple augmentation of the BL model by adding lagged values of the variables in 
the model; i.e. an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) form of the BL model.
11 This will 
capture the short run dynamics of the model, and we will be able to compute the long-run 
solution also. For the estimation to be valid, this extension of the BL model requires that the 
included variables be stationary, or that we difference them in order to make them stationary. 
However, the differencing of variables removes the long-run information contained in them, 
and therefore the ECM framework should be used when the data permits. The data in this 
study is a mix of stationary and non-stationary variables, so the normal ADL form will be 
used for the demand function, and an ECM will be used for the supply relation.  


















=+++++ ￿￿￿￿      (6)   
 
where  Z and  W  are defined as above. In order to identify the supply relation we need the 
coefficients of  P and  PZ so that we can define 
* Q . The obvious choice for these coefficients 
is the long-run, or cumulative- effects, parameters. These are derived by setting  tti QQ - = , 
                                                 
9 Given that the demand and cost functions are twice continuously differentiable. 
10 Steen and Salvanes (1999) propose a way to extend the BL model to incorporate these short-run market 
dynamics, and at the same time to also find the long run relation. Their solution to the problem lies in 
reformulating the BL model as an error correction model (ECM). This, however, must be seen as a special case, 
since we generally do not formulate an ECM unless we have a number of non-stationary cointegrated variables; 
especially, the dependent variable should be non-stationary for the ECM to make sense. In the case of stationary 
variables, the ECM is not a plausible model, due to the fact that the long-run stationarity that the error correction 
aims toward is, in a sense, always present, since we are dealing with stationary data.  
 
11 The ADL form is the general dynamic form and the error correction form can always be derived from it, as 
can be seen in any textbook on time series econometrics (e.g., Banerjee et al. 1993).  
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tti PP - = ,  tti ZZ - = ,  tti PZPZ - = ,  tti WW - =  and 
**
tti QQ - =  for all relevant i, and solving for the 
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We can now define   
 
( )
* / PPZ QQZ qq =+                   (9) 
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Lis now the measure of market power in the long run. We should however be cautious when 
trying to determine market power in the short run. There is no obvious interpretation of the 
various  's i l . If the objective is to measure market power in the short run, the 




4.  Data Specification 
The data used is weekly from Week 2, 1996, through Week 16, 1999.
12 While Nord Pool has 
been operating a spot market from 1993, it was not until January1996 that Sweden joined the 
market, and this is thus the natural time to begin the study. Finland joined the market in 1998, 
but was not fully integrated until March 1999, when the border tariffs were removed.  
Before that the system price referred only to Norway and Sweden. Therefore, the actual 
market area in the study is limited to Norway and Sweden,
13 and, when deriving the variables 
used for determining supply and demand, I use a weighted average of the Norwegian and 
Swedish data.  
I use the system price, as defined in Section 2.3, as the price variable, denoted by P. 
All prices are in Norwegian crowns (NOK, USD1»NOK 8.5). The amount of electricity 
traded is defined as the hypothetical turnover that would arise if there were no capacity 
limitations in the grid; i.e. system turnover is used as the quantity variable.  
 
4.1. The Demand Side 
The two most obvious variables that affect Nordic electricity demand are temperature 
(denoted by  T) and the level of industrial production (Prod). The length of the day from 
sunrise to sunset, which I call day length (D) for short, as an indicator of how much electricity 
is needed for lighting, is also a natural choice (Johnsen, 1998). We might also consider some 
sort of substitute price, such as fuel-oil prices, but as Johnsen (1998) shows, this factor does 
not seem to matter.  
  The natural choice of rotation, or interaction variables, are the interactions between 
price and the above mentioned exogenous variables, i.e. price times temperature and price 
times day length, denoted by PT and PD, respectively. Johnsen (1998) in fact shows that both 
temperature and day length do have an effect on the price elasticity of demand. The 
interaction between price and industrial production might also be considered but, while there 
might be an interaction between these variables in the very long run, the hope to capture this 
effect during a three-year period must be considered futile, so I do not include it. 
  The temperature variable is calculated as a weighted average of Swedish and 
Norwegian average temperatures.
14 The Swedish and Norwegian average temperatures are in 
                                                 
12 In Scandinavia weeks are numbered from the beginning of the year to the end, with Week 1 starting on the 
first Monday of the year.  
13 The short period of Finnish integration should not be expected to substantially affect the results. 
14 The weights used are 0.6 for Sweden and 0.4 for Norway, which approximate the ratio between Swedish and 
Norwegian GNP. The same weights are used when calculating average industrial production.  
 
13
turn calculated as the mean temperature of 11 Swedish cities and of 6 Norwegian cities, 
weighted by their respective population.
15  
  Industrial production is measured as a weighted average of the Norwegian and 
Swedish industrial production indexes.
16 Since these indexes are only available on a monthly 
basis, and the rest of the data is on a weekly basis, a simple interpolation was used to derive 
weekly estimates of industrial activity. This was done by fitting an exponential f unction 
between each monthly observation, in order to get an approximately constant percentage 
change within each month. A simple method like this does not yield perfect results, but the 
variation in activity within months should be small and the benefit of having data on a weekly 
basis clearly outweighs any lack of accuracy.  
Day length is simply a deterministic variable, defined as the time from sunrise to 
sunset in Göteborg. The choice of place has no consequence, since measuring day length 
somewhere else only induces a shift upwards or downwards in the variable. 
 
4.2. The Supply Side 
On the supply side we need to find an approximation of the marginal cost function and 
variables that might induce a shift in it. From theory
17 we know that the cost function for the 
power industry should have the general shape shown in Figure 2. 
Quantities up to Q1 represent hydropower production, which has virtually no variable 
cost at all. Additional quantities from Q 1 to Q 2 represent production from nuclear power 
plants, which have a higher marginal cost than hydropower, but still fairly small, and more 
importantly, constant. The last curved part of the marginal cost curve represents residual 
power, coming from such sources as waste, bio fuel, coal or oil. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
  In order to define the supply relation, we must obtain an approximation of the 
marginal cost curve, as described above, and account for any factors that might induce a shift 
in it such as wages, or fuel prices: the price of coal or oil, or the cost of uranium for the 
nuclear plants. However, coal and uranium prices are very stable, and the oil price has not 
moved much over the period; besides, oil accounts for a very small part of the residual-power 
output in Scandinavia nowadays. Since the power industry is not labour-intensive, wages are 
also not expected to have much impact on overall production costs. Instead, we must look at 
                                                 
15 The Swedish cities are Karlstad, Hudiksvall, Göteborg, Östersund, Kiruna, Stockholm, Växjö, Visby, 
Sundsvall, Malmö, and Luleå. The Norwegian cities are Oslo, Bergen, Narvik, Tromsö, Bodö, and Stavanger. 
16 Not adjusted seasonally or otherwise.  
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the power industry from the perspective of Scandinavia, where hydropower accounts for 
about two-thirds of total power production. As discussed earlier, while hydropower has a very 
small actual marginal cost, it might indeed have a large and varying opportunity cost, in the 
sense that producing an extra amount of power means giving up the opportunity to store that 
amount of water in the water reservoirs, belonging to the power stations. The factors affecting 
this opportunity cost are the inflow of water to the reservoirs due to rainfall, snowfall and 
snow melting (denoted by I), and how full they already are. However, while both these 
variables (inflow and available capacity) can be seen as shift variables for the supply relation, 
it might be better not to include them both, because while inflow to the reservoirs is an 
exogenous variable, the available capacity is an endogenous variable determined within the 
model
18. In any case, lagged values of inflow can be used as additional shift variables to pick 
up most of the available-capacity information. 
 
4.3. Market Trends       
Since Nord Pool is not a mandatory pool, only a limited part of all power traded on the Nordic 
market is brokered there; the rest is handled through bilateral contracts. In the beginning of 
1996, Nord Pool’s market-share was about 10%, whereas by early 1999 it had risen to about 
25%, of all power traded in Norway-Sweden.
19 There has thus been a great increase in the 
turnover at Nord Pool over the last couple of years, as more participants have entered the 
market. 
When estimating the demand and supply relations this exogenous trend must 
somehow be adjusted for. The simplest way would be to include Nord Pool’s market share as 
an explanatory variable for both demand and supply. A similar way is to regress system 
turnover at Nord Pool against the market-share trend. The residuals from this regression are 
used as de-trended values, in the demand and supply relation.
20 This approach gives us the 
opportunity to see how trade at Nord Pool would have varied over time, if its market share 
had been constant. 
                                                                                                                                                         
17 See for example Andersson (1997). 
18 If the reservoirs had been full during some periods and inflow of water had been lost due to this, inflow would 
have had to been treated as an endogenous variable. This, however, is very rare. 
19 When calculating Nord Pool’s market share there are two obvious choices to choose between. Either we divide 
turnover at Nord Pool by total production or by total consumption within the market area. The two approaches 
yield similar but not identical results. I opt for the consumption approach here since this has the benefit of 




After de-trending, the typical cyclical behaviour of turnover over the year is obvious 
(see Figure 3), with troughs in the summers and peaks in the winters. Since the residuals are 
used as detrended values, there is now negative turnover in certain periods, but this is only a 
matter of scale and has no impact on the results. Throughout the rest of the text, when 
estimating demand and supply, I will use the de-trended values of turnover, denoted by  Q, 
unless otherwise stated.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
  Since Nord Pool is a spot market, much of the power traded there is due to unexpected 
demand fluctuations. Unexpected fluctuations are best met by residual power production,
21 
which is not always in use, and by hydropower when available. Most of the large bilateral 
contracts, however, are based on hydro- and nuclear power, and I therefore make the 
assumption that all or at least the vast majority of residual power produced is traded on Nord 
Pool. But the amount of residual power produced, is always smaller than the total amount of 
power traded at Nord Pool, and while Nord Pool’s market share has increased significantly 
over time, the production of residual power has not done so, which means that the percentage 
of residual power traded at Nord Pool has declined. Given the circumstances, this decrease 
must be seen as an exogenous process, which needs to be accounted for when estimating the 
supply relation.
22 This process is important, since residual power is generally more expensive 
than the base-load of hydro- and nuclear power, and a decrease in the percentage of residual 
power traded is likely to affect price. When estimating the supply relation, I therefore include 
the percentage of residual power traded at Nord Pool as an explanatory variable, referred to 
from now on as the residual-power trend, and denoted by  R. Including two t rends as 
regressors would lead to redundancy in the explanatory variables if the two trends were not 
clearly distinguishable from one another, but in this case they are in fact quite different.  
 
5.  Preliminary Tests and Empirical Model Specification 
 
5.1 Integration Tests 
Prior to specifying the empirical model, I test whether the variables included are stationary or 
not, but the actual data exhibit strong seasonal patterns which need to be adjusted for, before 
                                                                                                                                                         
20 These two approaches are not equivalent when lagged values of turnover are used as explanatory variables. 
Given that it is the de-trended turnover that is of interest, I consider the approach I am using to be the better one, 
under the circumstances. 
21 Import is included in my definition of residual power. 
22 Demand is unlikely to be affected.  
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testing for stationarity. I introduce weekly dummy variables, Weeki, and, for every relevant 
variable









=++ ￿                            (12) 
 
where  ˆt y  is the regression residual. We may now view  ˆ y  as the de-seasonalized values of  y . 
Thereafter the ordinary augmented Dickey-Fuller test is performed on  ˆ y , using the BIC
24 
criterion to determine the number of lags
25.  
All variables except system price, the interaction between price and day length, the 
interaction between price and temperature, and the residual power-trend appear to be 
stationary with test statistics significant at the 1% level. The test statistic for the interaction 
between price and temperature is significant at the 5% level but not at the 1% level, and I 
choose to treat this variable as non-stationary. The test results yield no surprises. Little has 
happened in industrial production the last three years and there is no a priori reason for 
turnover at Nord Pool to be non-stationary, once the market-share trend is removed and it has 
been adjusted for seasonality. Temperature, adjusted for seasonality, is almost by definition 
stationary, and inflow is merely the sum of rain- and snowfall. Neither price nor the residual 
power trend can be expected to be stationary, and the interaction variables there is little to say 
about.
26  
Insert Table 1 about here.  
5.2. Cointegration Tests   
Having some of the variables I(0) and some I(1) poses a problem when estimating the model. 
This leaves two alternatives, either trying to find cointegration relations between the non-
stationary variables, or taking their first difference. As discussed earlier, differencing should 
not be used unless necessary, since it removes the long run information from the variables. I 
therefore choose the cointegration approach.  
  In the demand function, there are three variables I consider I(1): price, and the 
interaction terms between price and temperature and between price and day length. These are 
                                                 
23 Day length, deterministic variable, is not tested.   
24 The Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion, also abbreviated as SBC. 
25 See Enders (1995). 




highly likely to be cointegrated and, as shown in Table 2 below, this proves to be the case. In 
the supply relation, price and the residual power trend are I(1). These two variables might also 
very well be cointegrated, since residual power is generally more expensive than base-load 
power, and if the relative supply of residual power is important enough when price is 
determined, then price and the residual-power trend might be cointegrated.  
Using the Johanssen procedure
27, I estimate the cointegration relation between P, PT, 
and PD. The null hypothesis of two cointegrating vectors cannot be rejected, at any 
reasonable significance level, using either the trace or the max test. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
I then test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of  PT  and  PD are zero in either of 
the two cointegration vectors. In both cases the null hypothesis is rejected, at all reasonable 
levels of significance, and the conclusion is that  both  PT  and PD are part of the 
cointegrating space. This result is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for market 
power to be identifiable.
28 Thus I call the test a separability test, to stress the importance this 
result has when determining whether the demand function is separable in either of the 
interaction variables, as will be seen in Section 6.1. Neither is it possible to exclude P from 
the cointegration space.  
The results from the analysis of P and R are not as straightforward. Using the trace 
test, the null hypothesis of no cointegration vectors can be rejected at the 2.5% level.
29 
However, the null hypothesis of one cointegration vector can also be rejected, at the 5% level, 
but not at the 2.5% level.
30 Given that I believe P and R to be non-stationary, I choose not to 
reject the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vector and instead reject the null hypothesis of 
no cointegrating vectors, given the strong significance in the trace test. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact of one large and one fairly small eigenvalue. 
  Thus, a cointegrating relation between  P,  PT, and  PD on the demand side, and 
between P and R on the supply side, is accepted. 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
                                                 
27 See Banerjee et al. (1993). 
28 Lau’s “impossibility theorem” states that market power is identifiable if and only if the demand function is not 
separable in at least one of the interaction variables.   
29 The critical values are: 2.5%-17.2, 1%-19.7. 
30 The critical values are: 2.5%-5.0, 1%-6.6.  
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5.3. The Empirical Model  
Since all the variables are highly seasonal, we might expect to have to include some seasonal 
dummies to account for it. However, the explanatory variables show the same seasonality as 
the dependent variables, and I expect the explanatory variables t o account for all the 
seasonality in the dependent variables, so I do not include any seasonal dummies.  
Another issue to consider is whether there has been any structural break during the 
time period. Looking at the price series, one might certainly consider a change to have 
happened at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, when there was a steep price fall. But 
1996 was a very dry year, which has big consequences in a region where hydropower 
accounts for a majority of all power produced. Since I have included both inflow to the water 
reservoirs and the residual power trend,  I am able to account for this price fall without 
resorting to any ad hoc dummy variables.  
  Assuming, then, a linear relationship in both the demand function and the supply 
relation, (except between price and output, where I expect marginal cost, as described in 
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where P1 is the first cointegrating vector between P, PT and PD, P2 is the second, and R1 is 









0.075 ttt P2PPD =-                                                (16) 
 
144.82 ttt R1PR =-                            (17) 
 
Both demand and supply now consist entirely of stationary variables, and supply is 
formulated as an ECM, since the dependent variable, P, is non-stationary. Since  Q
* is 
stationary, however, it is not included in the error-correction part of the model. Thus, there is 
not the same division between long-run and short-run measures of market power as in Steen 
and Salvanes (1999), but the short-run and long-run estimates can be calculated, as explained 
in Section 3.2.
32 The identification of market power is not yet ensured, but if the coefficients 
of either P1 or P2 are significant, market power will be identified. 
  To account for the possible simultaneity problem that always arises when dealing with 
demand and supply models, the system can be estimated using an instrumental variable 
technique, two-stage least-squares (2SLS); see Harvey (1990). The simultaneity problem 
comes from the inclusion of the endogenous variable P on the right-hand side of the demand 
equation, and from the inclusion of the endogenous variable Q on the right-hand side of the 
supply equation. The only time we do not face a simultaneity problem is with a totally 
inelastic supply or demand; n either case is expected here. As instruments for the demand 
equation I use inflow and lagged values of the explanatory variables. On the supply side, 
temperature, day length, and industrial production are used, together with lagged values of the 
explanatory variables in the supply equation. 
   
6. Empirical Results 
Using a general to specific approach, I first estimate (13) and (14), using the maximum 
number of lags considered plausible. Dealing with weekly data inevitably means that the time 
span covered by  the lags must be much shorter than what is normal when dealing with 
monthly or quarterly data. It is, therefore, not realistic to hope to cover the more structural 
time-dependencies that might occur in variables. Instead, I expect to capture the short-run 
dynamics that occur from week to week. Five lags seems an appropriate starting point, as this 
                                                                                                                                                         
31 It might seem strange that the the change in price, DPt, should depend on the level of other variables, but from 
an econometric point of view an autoregressive model in first difference can easily be rewritten as a model in 
level, and can thus be interpreted as such.  
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time length should be able to account for all the short-run dependencies that might be present 
in the variables. The next step is to see if this general model can be reduced to a more 
parsimonious one, using F-tests and the Schwarz criterion to find the most appropriate model. 
This process is outlined in Appendix 1 for the demand equation and in Appendix 2 for the 
supply equation. The models considered the most appropriate are shown below.  
 
6.1 The Demand Function 
The demand model shown in Table 4 is the parsimonious form of (13). Most of the lags 
included in the general form (using 5 lags) were not significant and have been removed.  
Insert Table 4 about here. 
Of the estimates of the parameters remaining in the model, all are highly significant 
except for the constant, with most of the t-statistics exceeding 3.0. Based on the Ljung-Box 
Q-statistics I reject both higher-order and lower-order autocorrelation in the residuals, which 
indicates that the model is well formulated. The 
2
R statistic is also very high. The individual 
estimates reveal some peculiarities: Lag 4 of turnover, industrial production and the 
cointegrating relations, P1 and P2, are all significant. It is probably not wise, however, to 
draw any strong conclusions from this evidence, since there is no a priori reason why lag 4 
should be of importance when dealing with weekly data. Instead, it is better to view these as 
some kind of adjustment parameters, adjusting for any initial over- or under-reaction from the 
market. The contemporaneous impact of an increase in industrial production is positive, as 
expected, but the effect of industrial-production-lagged-once is negative, and then there is a 
positive effect again at lag 4. This pattern is probably due to expectations, and the fact that the 
market has a speculative side, albeit small.  
With temperature, it’s only the difference, DTt, which has any impact on demand. This 
should not be too surprising, since it is an optional spot market that we are considering. 
Unexpected changes should have a large impact on demand. Day-length, a measure of the 
demand for electricity used for lighting, is also highly significant.  
With regard to the estimates for the cointegration vectors  0.128 ttt P1PPT =-  and 
0.075 ttt P2PPD =- , while lags 1 and 4 are highly significant, the contemporaneous value is 
not, which means that current price has no effect on current demand. There are at least two 
reasons for this. First of all, the data I am using is already aggregated to a weekly level from 
                                                                                                                                                         
32 Since the error-correction model can always be formulated as a normal ADL model, (14) is only a rewriting of 
the general form in (6).  
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hourly observations, which means that we might very well have a price-effect on demand in 
any period shorter than a week, but that the cumulative effect during the week is neutral. This 
would then mean that a price increase has both a positive and a negative effect on demand, a 
result which is not totally unsatisfactory, given that on the market there are speculative agents 
who might actually begin buying more when price increases, in the hope of further price 
increases. Second, few agents have the ability to monitor the market hour by hour, and thus 
probably make weekly plans for their purchases. They are then affected by last week’s price, 
since they use this as a reference price.
33 
Lags 1 and 4 of P1t and P2t are both highly significant, but only the long-run estimate 
of P2 is significant. This is very important, since, according to Lau’s “impossibility theorem”, 
market power is identified if and only if the demand function is not separable in both the 
interaction parameters. This amounts to at least one of the coefficients of PT or PD being 
significant. Since only P2 is significant in the long run, only PD has a long-run effect. For PD 
to be significant, it is sufficient that P2 is significant, since we have already proved, within 
the Johanssen framework, that P2 actually consists of P and PD, and does not exist if the 
interaction term is removed. Therefore, significance for P2 implies significance for PD. The 
sign of the coefficient in front of  P2t is negative for lag 1, and positive for lag 4. The 
cumulative, and long- run, effect is negative, though. Despite any speculative elements, we 
expect price increases to have a negative effect on demand. 
The  interpretation of the signs of the interaction terms, PT and  PD, are not so 
straightforward. These parameters are best interpreted from an elasticity perspective. The 
long-run own-price elasticity of electricity demand is defined as ePP=[][/] PPDactual DPQ qq +  
where  D is average day-length,  P is the mean of the system price, and  actual Q  represents the 
mean of actual system turnover, not the de-trended.
34 Thus, when interpreting the signs of the 
interaction parameters, we should ask what effect temperature and day-length have on the 
price-elasticity of electricity demand. Reviewing Johnsen’s (1998) results from his modelling 
of the Norwegian electricity market, we would expect the temperature effect to be negative 
and the day length effect to be positive. The reasoning behind this is that, although days are 
long in the summer, temperature is also relatively high, so that lighting probably accounts for 
a larger share of electricity consumption than in the winter. This leads to a larger sensitivity in 
demand the longer the day-length, ceteris paribus. The same argument holds for temperature, 
                                                 
33 Looking at the spot market in the short run, yesterday’s price, and not the current price, will affect demand on 
a daily basis, since bids are made one-day-ahead, and selling and buying bids are made simultaneously.  
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though the time periods are now reversed. In the winter, when temperatures are low, heating 
accounts for a larger part of electricity demand than in the summer, indicating larger price 
sensitivity when temperatures are low,  ceteris paribus. The long-run estimate of the 
interaction parameter PD is thus consistent with Johnsen’s (1998) results. 
Finally, I calculate the long-run price-elasticity of demand. This, however, should be 
understood with some caution, since the very concept of any long-run price- elasticity on a 
spot market is doubtful, since the spot market by its very nature is short-term. The estimate of 
the own-price elasticity, ePP, is –0.039. As a comparison, Johnsen (1998) estimates the price 
elasticity to be between –0.05 and –0.35 for the sample period 1994:34 to 1996:52, but great 
changes have happened in the market since then
35. 
 
6.2. The Supply Relation 
The parsimonious supply relation, which is derived from the general form in (14), using 5 
lags, is presented in Table 5. It is estimated using 2SLS, with  1 t P- D ,  1 t I - D ,  1 t Q - D , 
*
1 t Q - ,  t D D , 
t T D  and  t Prod D  as instruments. 
*
t Q  is calculated as  /() tPPDt QD qq +  using the long-run 
parameters from the estimation of the demand function. The supply relation is estimated in an 
error-correction form where the first lag of the cointegration vector between price and the 
residual power trend, R1t-1, constitutes the error-correction term. Most of the lagged variables 
included in the general model are removed, and the square of system turnover, 
2
t Q , is 
removed completely. This is not an unlikely result, since we can probably find a good linear 
estimate of the cost curve shown in Figure 2, given that the actual data are all in the vicinity 
of Q 2, as defined there. Like the demand model, no autocorrelation is apparent in the 
residuals. While we have a much lower 
2
R , 0.37, than in the demand model, this is due to the 
model being estimated in differences instead of in levels,
36 and should thus cause no concerns.  
Insert Table 5 about here. 
The only parameter that is not significant is the coefficient of 
*
t Q . Thus no market 
power would appear to be present. While the coefficient of 
*
t Q  is supposed to be between 0 
and –1 (since no minus sign is included in the regression equation (14), l changes sign), the 
fact that the estimate here is positive should be of no concern, since it is not significantly 
                                                                                                                                                         
34 Since PT is not significant in the long run, it does not affect long run price elasticity. 
35 For a discussion about low price-elasticities in electricity spot markets, see Newbery (1997), and Borenstein et 
al. (1999b). 
36 The 
2 R statistic is not invariant to differencing and other such transformations of the data.  
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different from 0. Thus it should be interpreted as 0 and not as positive. The other estimates 
also reveal some interesting facts about the supply-side of the spot market. First of all, DPt, 
which is the dependent variable in the regression, does not seem to be an autoregressive 
process; none of the lags were significant as explanatory variables. It also turned out to be 
possible to reduce the 5 lags of Qt, It, and Rt to the first difference of these variables. DQt has 
the obvious positive sign: An increase in inflow causes a price decrease, a natural albeit not 
entirely obvious result, since hydropower could be used quite strategically. As for DRt, there 
is a positive sign on the coefficient, which is unsurprising, since a larger percentage of 
residual power should either increase the price or leave it unaffected. The error-correction 
parameter, the coefficient in front of  R1t-1, is significant but small. There is only a 7% 
correction towards long-run equilibrium in any given week. This is only natural, though, since 
the data is on a weekly basis and little adjustment is to be expected.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Using a dynamic augmentation of the Bresnahan-Lau model, I examined the spot market for 
electricity on the Nordic Power exchange, Nord Pool, for any signs of market power. I used 
system price and system turnover, i.e., the price and turnover realised when no transmission 
constraints are binding, as my price and quantity variables. 
The main result is that no market-power was apparent in the spot market; there was a 
clear rejection, and the relevant parameter was nowhere near significant, either in the short 
run or in the long run. However, since I used weekly aggregated data in the study (the actual 
data observations being on an hourly basis), there might be some market power in the very 
short run, most likely in the high demand hours. If it exists, this market power must be very 
small, though, since otherwise it would have shown up in the aggregated data. 
Likewise, there might be some regional market power (of which Johnsen et al. (1999) 
found evidence) present but not detected in this study, since the various price areas that 
appear when transmission constraints are present, were not considered. The objective was to 
find out if Nord Pool functions properly, as a market place, and the relevant price at Nord 
Pool is the system price. This price does not directly account for transmission constraints, but 
since it is at the intersection of aggregate supply and aggregate demand, the firms submitting 
bids must have taken into consideration the possibility of transmission constraints, assuming 
that they acted rationally. This means that system price, in a sense, already includes 
expectations of capacity constraints. If firms do not consider transmission constraints when  
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submitting bids, regional market power would appear stochastically and would most likely be 
of no significance. 
If we accept that there is no significant market-power in the Nord Pool area as a 
whole, the question is why. All studies performed on other power markets have found actual 
or at least potential market power. Wolfram (1999), for example, argues that British 
generators are not exercising as much market power as they are able to do, possibly because 
of the threat of further entry or fear of further regulations. Neither of these reasons is likely to 
affect the Nordic market, with a rather low concentration, and regulatory measures being an 
option only in the very long run. Considering market rules, one of the big differences between 
Nord Pool and the British market is that Nord Pool is a non-mandatory pool. Wolak (1997) 
argues that in an optional pool there will be agents with bilateral contracts, who are ready to 
offer in the spot market when prices rise enough. Thus, high bids in the spot market may be 
met by increased supply, rather than by higher prices.  
The effect of having more or less hydropower in a power market is far from clear. 
While most studies argue that the more hydropower available, the less potential market 
power, nothing has actually been proved. Borenstein et al. (1999b) show that the potential for 
market power in the Californian market is higher, during periods when hydropower is scarce. 
However, it is far from obvious that the availability of hydropower has the same effect in the 
Nordic market, where hydropower is the dominant source, as it does in the Californian 
market, where hydropower makes up a much smaller part of total generation. Hence, while it 
might be tempting to explain the absence of market power at Nord Pool with the abundance of 
hydropower, this is merely speculation.  
The absence of market power in Nord Pool is thus not easily explained by comparison 
with the British and Californian markets, where market power is present. While the British 
market has most of the indicators usually associated with market power, such as very high 
market-concentration, little hydropower, and a mandatory pool, this is not true for the 
Californian market, where, most importantly, market concentration is much lower than in the 
UK. The most natural conclusion to draw then, is that the very low market-concentration in 
Norway is enough to ensure competitive behaviour in the joint Norwegian-Swedish market, 
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for order of integration 
         I(0)  Lag  I(1)  Lag 
Q  De-trended Turnover  -3.77**  1     
P  System Price  -1.21  0  -11.46**  0 
I  Inflow    -5.96**  0     
Prod  Ind. Production Index  -3.70**  1     
T  Temperature  -8.64**  0     
PT  P*Temperature  -3.45*  0  -17.13**  0 
PD  P*Daylength  -1.29  1  -10.81**  0 
R  Residual Power Trend  -1.14  1  -12.59**  0 
** Significance at the 1% level. * Significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 2. Cointegration analysis of  P, PT  and  PD. Seven lags were  
used when determining the cointegration vectors. 
Eigenvalue  0.238  0.147  0.013 
H0:  r=0  r £1  r£2 
lmax  45.97**  25.97**  2.20 
95% critical value  21.0  14.1  3.8 
ltrace  74.15**  28.17**  2.20 
95% critical value  29.7  15.4  3.8 
 
Standardised eigenvectors 
Variable  P  PT  PD   
  1.00  -0.128  0.00   
  1.00  0.00  -0.075   
 
Test for separability 
H0: b1,PT=0  23.73**   
H0: b2,PD=0  23.73**   
H0: b1,P=b2,P=0  38.95**   






Table 3. Cointegration analysis of P and R. Two lags were used in the cointegration analysis. 
Eigenvalue  0.149  0.047   
H0:  r=0  r £1   
lmax  15.04*  4.52*   
95% critical value  14.1  3.8   
ltrace  19.55**  4.52*   
95% critical value  15.4  3.8   
 
Standardised eigenvectors 
Variable  P  R   
  1.00  -144.818   





Table 4. OLS estimates of the parsimonious demand function; weekly data  
from 1996:02 to 1999:16. N=172. 
Variable   Coefficient  Standard Error  t-value 
Constant  72.326  54.541  1.326 
Qt-1  0.701  0.051  13.677 
Qt-4  0.105  0.040  2.620 
P1t-1  0.185  0.041  4.540 
P1t-4  -0.141  0.041  -3.484 
P2t-1  -1.194  0.283  -4.226 
P2t-4  0.653  0.263  2.488 
DTt  -16.120  1.053  -15.303 
Dt  -14.453  2.824  -5.118 
Prodt  6.988  1.198  5.835 
Prodt-1  -8.6438  1.346  -6.422 
Prodt-4  2.696  0.456  5.909 
2 R   0.98     
Sums of the estimates of the individual components in P1 and P2 
Pt-1           -1.009   
PTt-1  -0.024   
PDt-1  0.090   
Pt-4  0.512   
PTt-4  0.018   
PDt-4  -0.049   
Static long-run solution
a 
Constant  372.2  285.9   
P1  0.226  0.223   
P2  -2.781  1.065   
D  -74.38  12.96   
Prod  5.353  1.856   
Estimates of the individual components of P2 in the long run
 
P  -2.781    (qP)   
PD      0.210  (qPD)   
Ljung-Box Q-statistics  p-value   
Q(1)   0.039  0.84   
Q(2)  1.849  0.40   
Q(4)  4.077  0.40   
Q(8)  6.640  0.58   
Q(12)  7.274  0.84   
Q(24)  26.755  0.32   
Q(36)  33.152  0.60   





Table 5. 2SLS estimates of the parsimonious supply relation; weekly data from 1996:02 to 
1999:16. N=172. 
Variable   Coefficient  Standard Error  t-value 
Constant  8.949  4.287  2.088 
DQt  0.058  0.024  2.443 
DIt  -0.002  0.0008  -2.604 
DRt  95.211  16.388  5.810 
*
t Q   0.0001  0.004  0.036 
R1t-1  -0.069  0.032  -2.195 
2 R   0.37     
 
Estimates of the individual components in R1t-1 
Pt-1  -0.069     
Rt-1  9.992     
       
Ljung-Box Q-statistics  p-value   
Q(1)   0.234  0.63   
Q(2)  0.420  0.81   
Q(4)  0.660  0.96   
Q(8)  3.898  0.87   
Q(12)  10.578  0.57   
Q(24)  18.770  0.76   








  Appendix 1 
 
Derivation of the Demand Model 
 
Table A2.1. F statistics and Schwarz criteria for sequential reduction of the general demand 
model to a parsimonious model. 
Null hypothesis                                                  Maintained hypothesis 
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1.  The first three columns report the model number, the number of unrestricted parameters, 
K, and the Schwarz criterion, SC. The three entries within a given block of numbers in the 
last 5 columns are: the F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis against the maintained 
hypothesis, the degrees of freedom for the F -statistics (in parentheses), and the tail 
probability of the F-statistics (in brackets). 
2.  Model 1 is the general demand model (13) with k=5 except that only  one lag of day 
length,  D, and temperature, T , are included, since it is not reasonable for greater lagged 
values of these variables to have any effect on contemporaneous demand. Model 2 is 
Model 1 excluding the fifth lag of Q, P1, P2, and Prod, and excluding the lagged variable 
of day length,  1 t D - . Model 3 is Model 2 excluding the third lag of  Q, P1, P2, and Prod. 
Model 4 is Model 3 excluding the second lag of  Q, P1, P2, and Prod, and imposing the  
 
37
restriction  1 tt TT - =- , that is,  t T  and  1 t T -  are replaced by  t T D . Model 5  is Model 4 
excluding P1t and P2t.  
3.  While the demand model should be estimated using instrumental variables and 2SLS, the 
use of such a technique in a sequential reduction as above demands the same instruments 
in every step. This, however, poses a problem,  since I use lagged values of the 
explanatory variables as instruments in the demand function. In practice, however, 
instrumental variables usually have a very small impact on the result, and I therefore 
perform the reduction of the model using normal OLS. Since Model 5 does not include 
any endogenous variables on the right-hand side, this model need not be estimated using 
2SLS, and thus OLS is used also for the final model. The results from estimating Model 5, 






Derivation of the Supply Model 
 
Table A3.1. F statistics and Schwarz criteria for sequential reduction of the general supply 
model to a parsimonious model. 
Null hypothesis                                                  Maintained hypothesis 
























































































































































1.  The same procedure is used here as for the demand model. Thus the initial reduction 
sequence is done using normal OLS, and only in the final stages is 2SLS used. The 
notation in Table A3.1 is the same as in Table A2.1. 
2.  Model 1 is the general supply model (14), using k=5 lags. Model 2 is Model 1 excluding 
lag 5 of each variable. Model 3 is Model 2 excluding lag 4 of each variable except the lag 
of squared system turnover, 
2
4 t Q - . Model 4 is Model  3 excluding squared system 
turnover, 
2
t Q , and all lags thereof. Model 5 is Model 4 excluding lag 3 of each variable. 
Model 6 is Model 5 excluding lag 2 of each variable. Model 7 is Model 6 excluding 
1 t P- D ,  1 t R - D  and 
*
1 t Q - . Model 8 is Model 7 with the restrictions  1 tt QQ - =-  and  1 tt II - =-  
imposed.  
3.  The reduction to Model 8 from Model 6 is significant at the 5% level. Model 6 is 
therefore reestimated with 2SLS using  2 t Q - ,  2 t I - ,  2 t P- D , 
*
2 t Q - ,  t D D ,  t T D  and  t Prod D  as 
instruments. The restrictions imposed by both Models 7 and 8 are now tested, using a 
Wald test. This has a c
2 distribution with 5 degrees of freedom; see Harvey (1990).  The 
test statistic is 7.49 and has a p-value of 0.19. Since the restrictions are not significant, 
Model 8 is considered valid and I estimate it using 2SLS with  1 t P- D ,  1 t I - D ,  1 t Q - D , 
*
1 t Q - , 
t D D ,  t T D  and  t Prod D  as instruments.
37  The results from this regression, using the full 







                                                 
37 Sargan’s validity test is used to test the instruments. It has a  c
2 distribution with (p-h) degrees of freedom, 
where p is the number of instruments and h is the number of regressors on the right-hand side of the equation. 
Thus there are 5 degrees of freedom in Sargan’s test for both Models 6 and 8. The test statistics for Models 6 and 
8 are 1.64 and 6.60 with p-values of 0.90 and 0.25, respectively.    